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1 Introduction
Oneof themost entrenched commitments in all of philosophy is the idea that, at least for some
reactions, rationality should be understood in competitive terms. To understand rationality
in this way is to think that there are multiple reactions competing against each other to win
rationality’s prize, which is having the status of being rational.
Traditional epistemology has eagerly embraced this competitive conception of rational-
ity. But theparticipants in the competitionhave traditionally been seen as a small group. Belief
and disbelief are obvious competitors.1 Nearly everyone, at least after some badgering, also
*Thanks to audiences at the Northeast Normativity Workshop, the Penn Normative Philosophy Group,
and a Colloquium at Penn, especially Kate Nolfi, Nate Sharadin, Jennifer Morton, Sarah Paul, Daniel Fogal,
Max Hayward, Jack Woods, Derek Shiller, Max Lewis, Grace Boey, Michael Vazquez, Paul Musso, Michael
Weisberg. Thanks also to Jane Friedman, Jim Pryor, and Kurt Sylvan for crucial conversations and Sebas-
tian Schmidt for very helpful written comments. The research leading to these results has received funding
from the People Programme (Marie Curie Actions) of the EuropeanUnion’s Seventh Framework Programme
(FP7/2007-2013) under REA grant agreement n° [609305]. Research on this project was also supported by
the Freiburg Institute for Advanced Study (FRIAS), University of Freiburg, Germany.
†Draft of September 20, 2019. Citing and quoting encouraged, but please ask permission before quoting
(errol.lord@gmail.com).
1The orthodox assumption is that belief and disbelief are fundamentally the same attitude that are differ-
entiated by a difference in content. When it comes to some proposition p, belief involves being settled that
p and disbelief involves being settled that :p. It is fine for us to assume this view, here. I hasten to note,
though, that there is somemotivation for thinking that while both involve settling, they are not essentially the
same attitude. The basic idea is that belief involves a sort of positive settling, whereas disbelief involves a sort
of negative settling. One motivation for going in for this is that you eliminate the requirement that one be
competent with negation in order to disbelieve. On this view, disbelief is a relation to p, not :p.
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admits that there is a third participant, which is suspending judgment aboutwhether p. When
we suspend judgment, we adopt a sort of principled neutrality with respect to p and:p.
On a flatfooted understanding of epistemic rationality’s (coarse grained) competition,
for any proposition p, the merits of believing p, disbelieving p, and suspending about p com-
pete against one another. When this competition is won by an option, that option is rational.
Many think something even stronger, which is that there will always only be one winner; this
is to say that for every proposition p and every agent in some particular rational circumstance,
only one of the options will win and thus be rational. While I think this is plausible, I won’t
assume it in full generality here. I will, however, assume that most of the time only one option
will win.2
This paper has three main tasks. The first two tasks aim to complicate this traditional
picture. The first complicating factor is that there are many different reactions one can have
about p that intuitively count as a sort of neutrality about p. Given this, it is not clear why
we should think that there are only three participants in epistemic rationality’s competition.
This first complicating factor puts the onus on everyone to sort through these different ways
of being neutral and take a stand on which ones compete with belief and disbelief.
The second complicating factor—discussion of which comprises the second part of the
paper—is that there are really four participants in epistemic rationality’s competition. This is
fewer than all the ways that one can be neutral butmore than the traditional three. I will argue
that we should admit two sorts of suspension but shouldn’t allow several other ways of being
neutral. The arguments for this conclusion will turn on a conception of what it takes to be a
participant in the relevant competition.
The final task is to argue that investigating the participants in rationality’s competition
is a good way of investigating the reach of epistemic rationality. This is important for several
reasons. First, it gives us some leverage on just what the epistemic domain is. Second, and
more specifically, it gives us leverage in the debate about whether only the evidence bears on
epistemic rationality. A common thought shared by evidentialists—those that think only the
evidence matters—is that evidentialism is strongly motivated because it doesn’t make sense
to have non-evidential factors bear on epistemic rationality; the common rationale given for
this claim is that the epistemic is only concerned with the truth. In the third part of the paper,
I will argue that this motivation is illusory. This is because the two sorts of suspension that
are participants in epistemic rationality’s competition can be justified by non-evidential fac-
tors. But they are in the epistemic’s reach. So it is just not true that we can only appeal to the
evidence when discussing the epistemic.
2Those who think that only one option will win hold the uniqueness thesis; those who think sometimes
more than one option wins (or there are ties) are so-called permissivists. See Kopec & Titelbaum (2016) for
a primer.
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2 OnBeingNeutral
2.1 Varieties of Neutrality
Let’s start by thinking about some baseline features of suspension of judgment. The first fea-
ture is that suspension is a reaction. It follows that not taking a stand is insufficient for suspen-
sion. At least before thinking of this example, I had no view about the claim that Trump is
President and Mannheim has an odd number of hairs within its limits. That does not mean
that I suspended judgment about that claim. I just had no view.3
A second baseline feature is that suspension is rationally evaluable. It is the sort of thing
that can be rational and irrational. This is obviously needed if it is going to be a participant in
epistemic rationality’s competition.
A third baseline feature is that suspension is the sort of reaction that you can have for
reasons. When you find out that the probability of rain tomorrow is about the same as the
probability of no rain tomorrow, you can suspend judgment about whether it will rain tomor-
row for reasons; most naturally, your reason will be the fact that the evidence is balanced.
So far these are the features that all participants in the competition will have. Belief and
disbelief share them, and I think it’s very plausible that they are necessary for being in the
competition. Thus, these three features don’t differentiate suspension from belief and disbe-
lief. What does the differentiation?
To help get a grip on this question, it is helpful to think about what I will call one’s intel-
lectual outlook. One’s intellectual outlook is a reckoning of one’s doxastic stance on the world.
Epistemic rationality’s competition takes place within one’s intellectual outlook. Different
competitors play different roles within the outlook.4
To start, consider the fact that belief and disbelief are both ways to determine whether p
within one’s outlook. When you believe p, p is determinedwithin your outlook; functionally,
this means that, other things equal, you will proceed as if you inhabit a p-world. Similarly,
when you disbelieve p, :p is determined within your outlook. When you disbelieve p, you
move forward as if you are in a:p-world.
One difference between suspension and belief and disbelief is that suspension does not
involve determining p in either of these ways. To use a nice phrase from Sturgeon (2010),
suspension is a committed neutrality. So, in trying to figure out which state or states suspension
3This isn’t meant to suggest that suspension of judgment is always the conclusion of some bit of reasoning,
or is always the result of deliberation, or is in some other way always the result of an occurrent bit of mental
activity. We sometimes automatically suspend. The point is just that for some claims we have no view rather
than suspend. Thanks to Sebastian Schmidt for discussion here.
4This is misleading in one crucial way: It implies that there is only one intellectual outlook. This, I think,
is false. One’s partial beliefs provide another intellectual outlook. There is, of course, great debate about the
relationship between the intellectual outlook comprised of one’s coarse grained attitudes (belief, disbelief,
suspension) and one’s credences. As we’ll see, I don’t think we can reduce suspension to credences. I don’t
think we can do it for belief, either. Thus, I think the two outlooks are constitutively separate, which is not to
say there are no necessary connections between the two.
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is, we need to investigate the ways in which we can be committed to neutrality. We need to
investigate the ways in which p can be in your outlook in a neutral way.
As it happens, it looks like there are several states that can be reasonably described as
commitments to neutrality about whether p. An obvious candidate ismiddling credence about
p.5 Take credence .5 in p. This meets the three minimal requirements for being a competitor.
It is also seems to be a way of having a commitment to a sort of neutrality with respect to
p. Plausibly, there are many credences near the middle that have the same features. Hence,
having a middling credence in p is a sort of neutral stance about p.
A second batch of states is a range of related beliefs you might have about your position
with respect to p. There are many different beliefs you could have that could naturally be
construed as commitments to neutrality. For example, you might believe that the evidence is
balanced. You might believe that there is no evidence for p or for :p. You might believe that
both p and :p are unknowable. You might believe that you are neither in a position to know
p nor in a position to know :p. You might believe that it is neither rational to believe p nor
rational to believe :p. You might believe that neither p nor :p are provable. The contents
of each of these beliefs are about ways in which the rational merits of belief and disbelief are
relatively neutral. Given this, it is plausible to think that believing those contents is a way of
taking a neutral stance.
A third possibility is more practical. Suppose you start investigating p and find out that
the case for p and the case for :p is neutral in one of the above ways. You might come to
believe that you are neither in a position to know p nor in a position to know :p. But, in
an obvious way, this belief is not really a stand about whether p. This belief is about your
epistemic situation. So it wouldn’t be crazy to think that forming that belief isn’t sufficient for
suspension. One thing the belief might prompt, though, is an intention not to form a belief or
a disbelief.6 This intention seems straightforwardly to be a commitment to be neutral about
p.
These three options are perhaps the most obvious. There are two unobvious neutral
states that have been important to recent theorizing about suspension. The first is what Jane
Friedman calls interrogative attitudes.7 These are attitudes that take as their object the question
whether p. So, for example, when you are curious about whether p, you have an attitude di-
rected at whether p. One of the main functional roles of this attitude is to dispose one to be
on the look out for information that would settle whether p. Often we are in a state like this
when we suspend. So, for example, when I’m deliberating about whether to teach at 10 am or
at noon and I find out that I lack some information about my train’s future schedule, it might
be rationally required for me to suspend about which time to teach. But I will keep the issue
5Sturgeon (2010) argues persuasively that middling credence actually isn’t neutral in the right way. He
thinks a degreed notion—what he calls thick confidence—is neutral in the right way. See n. x below for more.
6Does this require doxastic volunteerism in order for the intention to be effective? It does require that
we can execute intentions not to believe. This doesn’t imply the strongest version of volunteerism, which
maintains that we can execute intentions to believe.
7See Friedman (2013b,a, 2015).
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in my outlook. A natural way of spelling this out is in terms of adopting a questioning attitude
about whether to teach at 10 or 12—this state disposes me to do things that will put me in a
position to settle the relevant question. Interrogative attitudes are states like this.
Interrogative attitudes are neutral positions about whether p. But they also involve a
kind of openness towards answering whether p. In fact, at least paradigmatically, they dispose
one to answer whether p. In other words, not only are they attitudes one takes towards the
question of whether p, they are also attitudes that orient one towards answering whether p.
In contrast, it looks like there are attitudes one can take towards the question whether p
that are not attitudes that orient you towards answering whether p. So, consider the question
of whether there was an even number of food particles in Karl Marx’s beard at the time of his
death. It is very likely that there is no evidence whatsoever that speaks to this question. So
neither belief nor disbelief is appropriate. Simply forgetting about it is an option that might
be permitted. But there seems to be a stance you could take that is more aggressive than this.
Rather than merely dropping the issue, you can bury the issue, which is to say you can adopt
an attitude towards whether p that disposes you to ignore the question. This attitude makes
you insensitive to information relevant to the question.
I’ll call attitudes that aredirected towardsquestions thatbury thosequestions anti-interrogative
attitudes. Sowhile adopting an interrogative attitude keeps p in your outlook in away that ori-
ents you towards settling the question, adopting an anti-interrogative attitude puts whether p
in the outlook by, in effect, taking whether p to be a bad question. In some cases this seems
to be the right stance to take—e.g., when our epistemic situations look to be permanently im-
poverished when it comes to some question (later I’ll argue there are some other situations
where it makes sense to adopt these attitudes).
2.2 WhichOnes Participate?
All of the stances just canvassed can be naturally seen as neutral stances towards p. Ortho-
doxy maintains that there is one neutral stance that is a participant in epistemic rationality’s
competition. Given the varieties of neutrality, someone whomaintains this view needs to tell
us which neutral state is the participant in the competition. Alternatively, one can give up the
traditional view and allow for multiple neutral participants.
The first thing to say is that it is unclear what the rules of the game are here. What we
need is amethod for testing whether or not a stance is a participant in our competition. There
are two simple and tempting tests to see if there is competition between our neutral states
and belief and disbelief. The first test examines whether there is a rational tension between a
particular neutral state and belief and disbelief. If there is a rational tension between adopting
a neutral state and adopting belief or disbelief, then we have some evidence that those states
compete. Call this the Tension Test.
Thesecond test examineswhether suspension is intuitively rational evenwhen somecan-
didate neutral state is not rational or whether suspension is intuitively irrational when some
candidate neutral state is rational. If there is either mismatch, then that is evidence that the
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candidate state is not aparticipant in the competition. Call this theRational IncongruityTest.8
As we’ll see in a moment, I think we can use the Tension Test to rule out one of the
options. However, it should be said right away that I don’t think this test can rule out all of
them. This is because I think it produces false positives. To put some ofmy cards on the table:
Middling credences and beliefs about one’s epistemic position with respect to p will be in
tension with believing p or disbelieving p. However, I don’t think this shows that those states
are true participants in the competition. This is why we need the Rational Incongruity test.
Before explaining why, let me first argue against the intention view.
2.2.1 Against the Intention View
Let’s start with the intention view. That viewmaintains that to suspend is to form an intention
to not believe or disbelieve p. I think there are clear cases where this view fails the Tension
Test. This is becausemost of our reasons for intention are straightforwardly practical and thus
can be generated no matter one’s evidential situation. For example, imagine you are a scien-
tist working for big tobacco in the early 1990s. You have been exposed to the overwhelming
evidence that smoking cigarettes causes a variety of serious health problems. However, you
are also now in a tough legal position because the federal government is poised to punish your
company and perhaps even you for decades of deception. Your lawyer informs you that once
all the evidence comes out, it will not be credible for you say that you didn’t believe smoking
kills. It would be better, he says, if you didn’t believe one way or the other, especially if this
neutrality can be supported by something that looks like sophisticated scientific reasoning.
In this case, I think it is very plausible that the scientist has decisive reasons to intend not
to believe either that smoking kills or that it’s not the case that it kills. He has decisive reason
to intend to have no stand. This is because this would be the best thing for him practically. If
he could get himself in that state, then he’d be able to truthfully testify that he is neutral (of
course the explanation that he would give for that is not the true explanation). Nevertheless,
this does not change the normative impact of the evidence. The scientist’s legal trouble does
not compete with the evidence. The evidence still demands belief. So it doesn’t look like the
reasons for intention compete with the reasons for belief in the needed way. Because of this, I
think it’s plausible that he both has decisive reasons to believe that smoking kills and decisive
reason to intend to neither believe nor disbelieve.
Now, fortunately for the lovers of justice, it is also plausible that his beliefs are not under
intentional control in the right way for his intention to have neither state to be causally effi-
cacious. So while he has decisive reason to form that intention, he is unlikely to succeed in
8Just to be clear from the outset: I do not think that failing this test is always a decisive blow against a view.
After all, if there are multiple ways of suspending judgment, then you are bound to have cases where one way
is rational even though suspension in another way is not rational. Since my view posits two different ways of
suspending, each way of suspending, onmy view, will fail this test in some cases. That said, I will only use this
test against theories that maintain there is only one sort of suspension—i.e., maintain that taking a particular
neutral stance is necessary for suspension. The test is easier to wield against these theories.
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carrying out the intention. So perjury about his epistemic life is likely his only real option.
A similar objection can be leveled at a recent view defended by Masny (FC) for a view
that is a hybrid of an intention view and belief view. According toMasny, suspension has three
conditions that are all necessary and jointly sufficient: (i) S believes that she neither believes
nor disbelieves that p, (ii) S neither believes nor disbelieves that p, (iii) S intends to judge that
p or not-p.
The problemwith this view is that it distorts the rational profile of suspension. Since this
is the section about intention views, we can start there. Masny’s intention condition doesn’t
pass either of our tests. First, it fails the Tension Test. It is easy to think of cases where one
has very good reasons to intend to come to some judgment about whether p that will not be
reasons to suspend. For example, there are very good reasons for me to intend to judge that I
was just offered a lifetime yearly income of $1bn (and, thus, I assume, good reasons to intend
to judge that I was just offered a lifetime yearly income of $1bn or it is not the case that I was
just offered a lifetime yearly income of $1bn). But these don’t seem to be reasons to suspend
judgment about whether I was just offered a yearly income of $1bn. What this shows is that
Masny’s intention condition does not pass theTensionTest—there is no tension between that
intention and belief and disbelief.
Masny’s intention condition also fails the Rational Incongruity test. There are cases
where it is irrational to have Masny’s intention even though suspension is rational. It is not
rational for me to intend to have an opinion about whether there was an even number of food
particles in Marx’s beard when he died, but it might be rational for me to suspend about this.
After all, no evidence will ever settle this matter for me. This is reason to suspend; in fact,
this sort of reason to suspend takes center stage in many discussions of the epistemology of
suspension.9
Now, this might be unfair to Masny’s considered view. After all, there are three condi-
tions. Two of them involvemental states. So perhaps reasons to suspend onMasny’s viewwill
be some combination of reasons to have the belief that I don’t believe p or:p and reasons to
intend to judge that p or judge that :p. In the yearly income case, I have excellent reason to
believe that I disbelieve that I was just offered a yearly income of $1bn; so I don’t have strong
reasons to believe I don’t believe or disbelieve and intend to believe or disbelieve.
But there are cases where I have strong reasons to have both the belief and intention yet
lack strong reasons to suspend.10 Suppose that Phillip thinks that he believes that members
of a certain marginalized group are morally equal to Anglo-Saxons. But then psychologically
observant friends start pointingout patterns of thought and actionof his that provide evidence
that he doesn’t believe this. He responds by pointing to certain patterns of thought and action
that provide evidence that he does believe they are equals. We can imagine that these two
bodies of evidence are roughly on a par. Thus, he has good reason to suspend about whether
9See Rosenkranz (2007) for many of the details.
10This case is a counterexample to Russell (1997), Crawford (2004)’s belief views too, which is why I won’t
discuss them in the subsection about belief views.
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he believes the groups are equal—i.e., good reasons to believe that it is not the case that (he
believes they are equal or he disbelieves they are equal). Further, we can imagine that Phillip
is an ordinary person in contemporary society who thus has good reason to intend to have an
opinion on this matter.
Thus, Phillip has strong reasons to believe he neither believes nor disbelieves and has
strong reasons to intend to believe or disbelieve. He doesn’t thereby have strong reasons to
suspend. We can suppose that he has particularly good evidence for thinking the groups are
equal; evidence that is even good enough to put him in a position to know that the groups
are equal. This is compatible with him having good reasons to have the relevant belief and
intention.
To be clear, I am not saying that Phillip is rational. It is plausible that he ought to believe
they are equal. So there is a rational tension between the reasons forMasny’s belief and inten-
tion and the reasons that bear on whether the groups are equal. So it looks like Masny’s view
passes the Tension Test. But it doesn’t pass the Rational Incongruity test. This is because this
is a case where Masny’s neutral state is rational even though suspension is not.
The first upshot of this subsection is that the prospects for pure intention views are dim
because the relevant intentions are not in tension with belief and disbelief in the right way;
as we saw, things get better by moving from a pure intention view to a hybrid intention-belief
view. But Masny’s particular hybrid view also fails because it fails the Rational Incongruity
test. Its intention-belief bundle can be rational even when suspension is not.
2.2.2 AgainstTheCredal View
Now let’s examine credences. The credal view of suspension maintains that to suspend about
p is to adopt some credence about p. Intuitively, it won’t just be some single amount of confi-
dence. Rather, there will be a range of credences one can adopt that are sufficient for suspen-
sion. We’ll just say that suspension is middling credence. TheTension Test allows us to check
this hypothesis. Whatwe are looking for is a rational tension betweenmiddling credences and
beliefs and disbeliefs.
Middling credences seem to pass the test. It is very plausible that having a middling cre-
dence about p is in tension with belief or disbelief that p. This is because in order to rationally
believe p, your credence in p needs to be high enough, and it will never be high enough if one
has a middling credence.
That’s the good news for the credal view. The bad news is that it fails the Rational In-
congruity Test. To pass this test, it would need to be that non-middling credence (which is
non-suspension on this view) is in tension with suspension. This does not appear to be the
case, as Friedman (FC) has demonstrated.11
11Sturgeon (2010) points out another reason to doubt suspension can be understood in terms of credence:
Suspension is a committed neutrality, yet credences are extremely precise ways of not being neutral. This is
evidence that credence is a particularly bad tool for understanding suspension.
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To see the problem, consider Lack of Evidence and Conjunction:
Lack of Evidence: If A lacks evidence for p and for :p, then it is permissible for A to
withhold about whether p.
Conjunction: If A is permitted to withhold about p, q, r...n, then A is permitted to
withhold about (p ^ q ^ r::: ^ n).12
Both of these principles are very plausible, but the credal view cannot vindicate them given
the standard norms on credence. To see why, let’s suppose any credence between .33 and .66
is middling. Now take three probabilistically independent claims p, q, and r. Suppose you lack
evidence with respect to all three. Thus, fromLack of Evidence, it follows that you are permit-
ted to suspend about all three. It should follow from Conjunction that you are permitted to
suspend about their conjunction. But it doesn’t follow from the credal view. This is because
even if you had the absurdly high credence of .66 in all three of them, the standard norms on
credence predict that your credence in their conjunction should be below .33 since your cre-
dence in the conjunction should be the product of your credences in the conjuncts. Thus, the
credal view maintains that you are not permitted to suspend about their conjunction. That’s
false.
What’s important for our test is that having non-middling credence is compatible with
rational suspension. If suspension is middling credence, then when you are required to have a
non-middling credence, you are required not to suspend. But in cases with the relevant form,
you are permitted to both suspend about (p ^ q ^ r) and have a non-middling credence
about (p ^ q ^ r). So having middling credence is not sufficient for suspension. Further,
the reasons that bear on suspension are not always reasons that bear on whether or not to
have middling credence. This is all evidence that middling credence is not a participant in the
relevant competition.
2.2.3 Against the Belief View
Now let’s turn to the most complicated case, which is the higher-order belief view. This view
maintains that to suspend is to have some belief about your epistemic position with respect to
p. To start, I will assume that the relevant belief is that you are neither in a position to know
p nor in a position to know:p.13
Sturgeon understands suspension in terms of what he calls thick confidence (often known as mushy cre-
dence). Friedman (FC) points out, in effect, that this view fails the Rational Incongruity test too. This is
because it predicts that suspension is always irrational when one ought to have a credence in some claim. This
is false.
12This claimmight be dubious in full generality. If you get enough conjuncts, perhaps one should disbelieve
the conjunction whilst suspending about all the conjuncts. But it is very plausible when restricted to relatively
small sets of claims. That is all I will need.
13This is the view Rosenkranz (2007) ends up adopting after considering several other potential contents.
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This view, like the credal view, passes the Tension Test. There is a tension between the
relevant higher-order beliefs and believing p and believing:p. That is, it is plausible that you
are generally irrational to both believe or disbelieve p and also believe that you are neither in
a position to know p nor in a position to know :p. Furthermore, it is plausible that reasons
to believe that you are neither in a position to know p nor in a position to know :p compete
with the reasons to believe p and the reasons to believe :p. So the higher-order belief view
seems to pass our first test.
As it was with the credal view, it is far from clear that having the relevant higher-order
belief is necessary for suspension and thus it looks like the higher-order belief view fails the
Rational Incongruity test. One reason why is that the higher-order belief requires conceptual
sophistication out of reach of many agents who appear to be able to suspend.14 position
to know is, at least seemingly, not an ordinary concept regularly possessed and deployed
by ordinary people. But ordinary people regularly suspend judgment. So it seems unlikely
that having that higher-order belief is necessary for suspension. The point is even sharper
when it comes to immature humans and animals. It is even less plausible that they possess
and regularly deploy those concepts. Yet they suspend.
Raleigh (FC) anticipates this overintellectualization objection. In response, he main-
tains that the content of the relevant belief is less sophisticated. Suspending, on Raleigh’s
view, involves ”a belief or opinion that one cannot yet tell whether or not p, based on one’s
evidence.” This is certainly better, but notice that this still requires one to have the capacity
to have beliefs about evidence. Further, one needs to have the capacity to have beliefs about
one’s epistemic situation with respect to p in order to suspend. This is a feature that it shares with
all higher-order belief views. This is because all higher-order belief views require beliefs about
one’s own situation in order to suspend. Suspension, on these views, thus requires a lot more
conceptual sophistication than belief and disbelief. To believe or disbelieve p, you just need
to have the capacity to entertain p. To suspend, you need to entertain not only p, you also
need to entertain claims about your intellectual situation vis-á-vis p. On Raleigh’s view, you
need to be able to entertain thoughts about what your evidence indicates.
Raleigh is clear eyed about the added sophistication his view requires. He thinks that it
is an important truth that suspension requiresmore intellectual sophistication than belief. He
writes, ”it is not at all clear that we are prepared to ascribe the attitude of suspending judge-
ment to simple believers such as young children or animals—I might describe my toddler or
my dog as hesitant or uncertain or just ignorant whether p, but it would sound pretty strange
to describe them as agnostic whether p. Agnosticism is plausibly a more sophisticated, intel-
lectually demanding attitude than belief.”
IfRaleigh is talking about vanilla suspension—thecompetitor inour competition—then
I think this is seriously mistaken. Young children and animals do suspend. Raleigh and I ap-
pear to agree that HOB views threaten this. His modus ponens is my modus tollens. To see
why this is seriously mistaken, it helps to have a fleshed out alternative on the table. So I will
14Friedman (2013a) makes a similar point.
10 of 18
Suspension of Judgment, Rationality’s Competition, and the Reach of the Epistemic
postpone a full explanation of why I think it is wrong to deny young children and animals the
capacity to suspend to the next subsection.
To warm up to the idea, though, note that it is not surprising for there to be problems
for the higher-order belief view, given the way I’ve set things up. After all, what we are looking
for are types ofmental states that compete against each other. But higher-order beliefs are just
beliefs. There is no clash in kind between beliefs and beliefs. So any clash here will simply be
a clash in contents. There is a clash in contents here—hence passing the Tension Test. But
a simple clash in contents shouldn’t make for a new participant in the competition. After all,
any content q that is inconsistent with p will clash with a belief that p. But that doesn’t mean
that beliefs that q are participants in the relevant competition.
I thus think we should rule out intentions, middling credence and higher-order beliefs
fromthecompetition. While there are rational connectionsbetweencredences about p, higher-
order beliefs about one’s rational situation vis-á-vis p, and belief and disbelief about p, we
shouldn’t think that those states all compete against each other.
2.2.4 For Interrogative and Anti-Interrogative Attitudes
This leaves interrogative attitudes and anti-interrogative attitudes. I do think that these two
states are participants in our competition. In order to see why, let’s return to the idea of an
intellectual outlook. We already know two ways for p to figure into one’s outlook. One can
believe that p or disbelieve that p. When p figures into one’s outlook in either of these ways,
the status of p is both settled and determined. When you believe that p, p is determined in your
outlook in virtue of the fact that you take p to be the case. When you disbelieve p, p is deter-
mined in your outlook in virtue of the fact that you take :p to be the case. To help contrast
this with the sort of determination involved in anti-interrogative attitudes (to be spelled out
more below), let’s call this Worldly Determination—so-called because beliefs determine the
status of p by taking a stand about the world.
The fact that belief and disbelief worldly determine the status of p within an outlook
is explained by the functional roles of those states. Belief that p disposes one to use p flat-
out in reasoning. So, other things equal, when you believe p, you will move forward in your
interactions with the world as if you inhabit a p-world.
Whenwe think about things this way, it is easy to see the evidence for thinking that inter-
rogative and anti-interrogative attitudes are participants in the competition. For it looks like
their functional roles are in obvious tension with the functional role of belief. Both interrog-
ative and anti-interrogative attitudes are essentially worldly undetermined states. When you
adopt either sort of attitude about whether p, you enter a state that essentially lacks a dispo-
sition to use p flat-out in reasoning. Further, interrogative attitudes also essentially dispose
you to settle the question of whether p. So they dispose you to do things that will induce be-
lief, but essentially lack the function of belief. Given this, it is easy to see why reasons to form
interrogative attitudes compete against the reasons to believe.
We can say similar things about anti-interrogative attitudes. These attitudes also essen-
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tially lack the dispositions involved in worldly determination. Further, these attitudes dispose
you to ignore any p-relevant information, at least as it pertains to p. So, unlike the interrogative
attitudes, these attitudes seek to prevent you fromdeterminingwhether p via belief. They seek
to prevent you from hearing the siren call of reasons to worldly determine whether p. Anti-
interrogative attitudes thus provide a different way of determining p’s status in your outlook.
We can call it Agnostic Determination. Given the fact that anti-interrogative attitudes involve
agnostic determination, one sort of sufficient reason to adopt an anti-interrogative attitude is
information that strongly suggests both that the current information doesn’t sufficiently con-
firm p or:p and that future information won’t sufficiently confirm p or:p.15
Now we are in a position to see why it is plausible to think that these four attitudes are
participants in our competition. It is because they are competing ways to settle the status of p
in your outlook. They are competing because their respective functional roles are in direct ten-
sion with each other. A belief that p is in tension with a disbelief that p because its functional
role involves taking the world to be a pworld whereas the functional role of disbelief involves
taking the world to be a:pworld; beliefs and disbeliefs are in tension with both interrogative
attitudes and anti-interrogative attitudes because beliefs and disbeliefs are essentially worldly
determining whereas interrogative and anti-interrogative attitudes are not; and interrogative
attitudes are in tension with anti-interrogative attitudes because anti-interrogative attitudes
are essentially agnostic determining whereas interrogative attitudes are essentially not.16
Beforemovingon, it isworth considering anobjection to this core thought—the thought
that the functional roles of the four states are in direct conflict. Theobjection contends that the
functional roles of interrogative andanti-interrogative attitudes arenot in fundamental tension
with the functional roles of beliefs because one can rationally believe p even though one is
disposed to gather more p-related information or is disposed to ignore p-related information.
If this is right, then it is not clear that my view passes the Rational Incongruity test. It looks
like we can get cases where one rationally believes and rationally has an interrogative or anti-
interrogative attitude.
I agree that there are cases where one rationally believes p and is rationally disposed to
gathermore information (think of a surgeonwho rationally believes she needs to take out your
liver). I also agree that there are caseswhereone rationally believes p and is rationally disposed
to ignore p-related information (think of the pathological overchecker who has already made
sure the oven is off 17 times). But this is not enough to show that there are cases where it is
15Anti-interrogative attitudes thus play the role that Rosenkranz (2007) wants agnosticism to do. He tries
to do the work with higher-order beliefs, but fails for the reasons laid out above. Miracchi (FC) also discusses
states with the functional role of anti-interrogative attitudes.
16Some virtue epistemologists—e.g., Sosa andMiracchi—have worried a great deal about how suspension
can be accommodated in a virtue theoretic framework. The basic issue is how to explain the epistemology of
suspension in terms of the sorts of epistemic aims central to such frameworks (e.g., the aim to know). This has
ledMiracchi to affirm that the epistemology of suspension is derivative in a certain way from the epistemology
of belief. My frameworkmakes this unnecessary. Miracchi’smistake, it seems tome, is to think that suspension
is, at bottom, just a lack of belief (which is sometimes accommpanied by some other things). This is what
makes it difficult to show that one can manifest aim at epistemic goods whilst suspending.
12 of 18
Suspension of Judgment, Rationality’s Competition, and the Reach of the Epistemic
rational to believe p and rational to have interrogative or anti-interrogative attitudes. This is
because there is more to interrogative and anti-interrogative attitudes than these interrogative
or anti-interrogative dispositions. Remember, interrogative and anti-interrogative attitudes
are essentiallynotworldlydetermining. Thatmeans they arepartly individuatedby a functional
lack—the lack of dispositions to move around as if it is a p or:pworld.
This, I admit, is a bit tricky to get one’s mind around at this level of abstraction. It helps
to contrast particular agents who are paradigms of believing and suspending. So, consider
Beatrice, Ingrid, and Anjali:
Beatrice the Believer: Beatrice has just finished investigating whether smoking
causes cancer. It clearly does, and she believes so. She is robustly disposed to
treat the actual world as a smoking-causes-cancer world, including disposed to
use that claim as a premise in reasoning and disposed to assert that claim.
Ingrid the Inquirer: Ingridhasbecome interested inwhether evidentialismabout
epistemic rationality is true. She has read some journal articles on it and the re-
sults are mixed. She has a questioning attitude towards the question of whether
evidentialism is true. This disposes her to seek out more information, see evi-
dentialism relevant information as salient etc.
Anjali theAgnostic: Anjali is promptedby anobnoxious philosophy example to
consider whether Karl Marx had an odd or even number of food particles in his
beard at the time of his death. This is a ridiculous question to consider, and it is
clear toAnjali that shewill never be in a position to determine the answer. So she
adopts an agnostic attitude towards the question, which disposes her to ignore
both the question and any information relevant to answering it (unfortunately
the obnoxious philosopher keeps bring it up, which makes it difficult to be fully
agnostic!).
The key point about Ingrid and Anjali is that they don’t merely have interrogative and anti-
interrogative dispositions. Ingrid has interrogative dispositions in virtue of having a question-
ing attitude and Anjali has anti-interrogative dispositions in virtue of having an agnostic atti-
tude.17
This is of a piece with believing and disbelieving. One can have belief or disbelief dispo-
sitions even if one doesn’t believe or disbelieve. When one does believe or disbelieve, one has
those dispositions in virtue of believing or disbelieving. What this shows, at a minimum, is
17While it might appear otherwise, these claims are not incompatible with a purely dispositionalist view
of doxastic attitudes. For on plausible dispositionalist views, whether one believes is determined by whether
one has a sufficient amount of the relevant dispositions (with sufficient robustness). When one does believe,
one might have any particular disposition in virtue of the fact that one believes, even if whether one believes
is determined by having a sufficient number of dispositions of the right kind.
13 of 18
Suspension of Judgment, Rationality’s Competition, and the Reach of the Epistemic
that finding agents who rationally believe and rationally have questioning or agnostic disposi-
tions is not enough to show that my view fails the Rational Incongruity test.
Our fleshed out intellectual outlook can provide an explanation ofwhy it is thatmiddling
credence and certain higher-order beliefs stand in tension with belief and disbelief. It is be-
cause reasons to have the higher-order beliefs or middling credence provide reasons against
belief and disbelief. Reasons to have middling credence about p will be provided by the evi-
dence, and facts about roughly equitable evidence for p and :p will themselves provide rea-
sons to suspend in one of the two ways. Similarly, reasons to hold the higher-order beliefs
will be evidence about the deficiency of one’s epistemic position, and that evidence itself will
provide reasons to suspend in one of our two ways.18
Finally, we are in a position to respond to Raleigh’s challenge laid out above. Recall that
Raleigh’s higher-order belief view—like all higher-order belief views—maintains that suspen-
sion about p is a matter of having beliefs about our epistemic position with respect to p. I
objected above to the added sophistication this demands from suspenders. Raleigh embraces
this result. He maintains that we hesitate from ascribing suspension to young children and
animals. Further, he thinks that suspension only makes sense given certain intellectual so-
phistication.
I hope it is clear now that my picture casts serious doubt over these claims. This much
seems right: There is a good design rationale for having interrogative and anti-interrogative
attitudes. This is because it is important to be able to place p in your outlook in ways that are
notworldly determining. When it comes to interrogative attitudes, it is important to be able to
place p in your outlook in away that aids determinationof the truth-value of p. When it comes
to anti-interrogative attitudes, it is important to be able to close p from future investigation. It
would be surprising if the only ways animals or small children could place p in their outlooks
is by believing or disbelieving—i.e., by taking a stance that involves worldly determination.
The upshot of this subsection is two-fold. First, there are good reasons for excluding
intentions, credences, and higher-order beliefs. Intentions and higher-order beliefs don’t have
the right subjectmatter. The relevant intentions are about believing or disbelieving p, whereas
the higher-order beliefs are about one’s epistemic situation vis-á-vis p. Credences do have the
right subject matter—viz., p—but they don’t seem to settle whether p when it comes to the
relevant outlook.
Thesecondupshot is that there is a goodcase for including interrogative andanti-interrogative
attitudes in epistemic rationality’s competition. They are both about the right subject matter
and they are ways of settling whether p in the right outlook. If this is right, then orthodoxy is
vindicated insofar as it was right to think that suspension is a full-blooded alternative to belief.
But, at the same time, if this is right, then orthodoxy was wrong to think that there were only
three participants in epistemic rationality’s competition. There are four, including two differ-
ent varieties of suspension that compete with each other as well as with belief and disbelief.
18For more details about this, see Lord & Sylvan (FC).
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3 TheReach of the Epistemic
One of the central debates about epistemic rationality is about whether the evidence provides
the only source of epistemic reasons. Evidentialists think that only the evidence can provide
epistemic reasons. Pragmatists deny this and hold that sometimes non-evidential considera-
tions provide epistemic reasons.19
Many—including past time slices of me—think that evidentialism has a sort of default
status because the evidential is clearly within the reach of the epistemic, whereas it is mysteri-
ous hownon-evidential factors canbewithin the reachof the epistemic.20 It’s not entirely clear
what this means, but the intuitive idea is that the epistemic is essentially tied to the truth, and
thus in order for some consideration to bear on epistemic rationality, it has to have some con-
nection to the truth. Theevidence clearlyhas this connection; it’s not clearhownon-evidential
considerations could fit.
I don’t doubt the force of this thought when we are at the beginning of our inquiry. But
the strategy for thinking about epistemic rationality deployed in this paper gives us the re-
sources to more precisely investigate the ultimate force of this thought. By thinking about the
participants of epistemic rationality’s competition, we are thereby thinking about which sort
of considerations bear on epistemic rationality—they are the considerations that recommend
the reactions that are the participants.
The important point is this: If belief and disbelief were the only games in town, then
evidentialism would be easily vindicated. But by nearly everyone’s lights they are not. The
competition also includes suspension. And the view about suspension defended in this paper
has the resources to cause serious trouble for evidentialism. To see this, weneed to think about
the sorts of reasons one might have for forming interrogative and anti-interrogative attitudes.
Some of them will be non-evidential.
Here is a pair of famous cases that illustrate this for interrogative attitudes:21
LowBank: It is Friday afternoonandSarah andYvettehave apaycheck todeposit. They
drive by the bank on the way home. There is a long line stretching out the door. Sarah
has good reason to think that the bank is open on Saturday—shewas there on Saturday
two weeks ago. There is no rush to deposit the check.
High Bank: It is Friday afternoon and Sarah and Yvette have a paycheck to deposit.
They drive by the bank on the way home. There is a long line stretching out the door.
Sarah has good reason to think that the bank is open on Saturday—she was there on
Saturday two weeks ago. Unlike Low Bank, though, it is crucial for them to deposit the
check before Monday. Their mortgage payment is due on Sunday and they don’t have
enough in the account to pay without the check being deposited.
19For a primer on this debate, see Lord (FC).
20See, e.g., Ichikawa et al. (2012), Gardiner (FC).
21These are slight variations on cases originally found in Stanley (2005). See Schroeder (2012, 2018),
DeRose (2009), Fantl &McGrath (2010).
15 of 18
Suspension of Judgment, Rationality’s Competition, and the Reach of the Epistemic
In High Bank, Sarah and Yvette have reasons to suspend that they lack in Low Bank. The fact
that their mortgage depends on the deposit is itself a reason to form an interrogative attitude
about whether the bank is open on Saturday. It is a reason to form an attitude about whether
p that disposes them to do things to settle whether p. And this reason is quite strong. This
explains the common intuition that it is not rational for them to believe the bank is open on
Saturday in High Bank. It’s not rational because the reasons to suspend defeat the reasons to
believe. They ought to suspend by forming an interrogative attitude about whether p.
Things are not so in Low Bank. There isn’t that reason to form an interrogative attitude.
So they don’t have that reason to suspend competing with the reasons to believe. Thus, there
isn’t that reason to suspend defeating the reasons to believe—i.e., the evidence. This explains
the widespread intuition that, in Low Bank, it is rational for them to believe the bank is open
on Saturday.
Of course, the rub is that by stipulation the evidence is the same in both cases. So if there
is a rational difference between the two cases, non-evidential factors can make a difference to
epistemic rationality. This, I think, is the conclusion we should draw. The key to demystifying
the anti-evidentialist intuitions is understanding the nature and rational profile of suspension.
Similar things can be said about anti-interrogative attitudes. Take the following pair of
cases as an illustration:22
Gritty PhD Student: Jason is a struggling second year PhD student at a top PhD pro-
gram. Jason is African American and is the first person in his family to go to university.
While he excelled at his small liberal arts college, he is finding it difficult to make his
place in graduate school. The faculty are busy and distant, and some of them are noti-
cably nervous interacting with him. As he progresses through his second year, the evi-
dence begins to mount that he will not succeed in the program. He has poured nearly
all his efforts as an adult to get to this place, though, and it is entirely unclear what he
should do if graduate school does not work out.
Trust Fund PhD Student: Shep is a struggling second PhD student at a top PhD pro-
gram. He is a white male student who was a legacy undergraduate at Harvard. He be-
came interested in philosophy and succeeded in it as an undergraduate despite a lack of
true passion. He didn’t know what to do after Harvard, so he applied to PhD programs
on a whim. He got into several top programs and chose the one he did mainly for its
proximity to good bars. As he progresses through his second year, the evidence begins
to mount that he will not succeed in the program. This doesn’t bother him too much
because if he drops out he can always live off his trust fund.
We can stipulate that Jason and Shep’s evidence about whether they will succeed is the same.
And we can suppose that it is weighty. How should they react to it? Some have the intuition
that it would, at the very least, be rational for Jason to display grit, which involves sticking to
22This case is inspired by Paul &Morton (2018). See also Marušić (2015).
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one’s long term plans despite significant evidence that one will not succeed. We can suppose,
if it helps, that Jason’s evidence is misleading. Once he pushes through his second year course
work, hewill find his research bearings, connectwith a thoughtful and supportive advisor, and
go on to have a successful career.
Theview sketched in this paper can explainwhat is goingonhere. Certain non-evidential
facts—e.g., the fact that a career in philosophy is what suits Jason the most, the fact that there
are no good alternative plans for Jason—provide reasons for Jason to suspend judgment about
whether he will succeed. They do this by providing reasons to form an anti-interrogative at-
titude. This attitude will dispose him to ignore (some of) the mounting evidence, which is
what he needs to do in order to push through the second year bottleneck. Now, it should be
said, that the dispositions involved in anti-interrogative attitudes can be more or less robust
(or more or less wide-ranging). They might dispose him to ignore anecdotal evidence, but
they won’t dispose him to ignore evidence provided by a letter officially removing him from
the program. That, though, is all to the good, for it does seem like anti-interrogative attitudes
should come in degrees. Perhaps there are other caseswhere fully robust dispositions arewhat
is called for.
Things might be different for Shep. Given his independent resources and lack of serious
passion for philosophy, he lacks many of the reasons to suspend that Jason possesses. Given
this, the only rational option for Shep might be to believe he will not succeed and seek out
something else. If this is right, then non-evidential factors make a difference to epistemic ra-
tionality.
My point here is that the view of suspension defended in this papermakes perfectly good
sense of why these non-evidential factors bear on epistemic rationality. It is because they bear
on suspension, and suspension competes against belief and disbeliefwhen it comes to epistemic
rationality. So the account gives an independentlymotivated rationale for allowing some non-
evidential factors to be within the epistemic’s reach.
Now, of course, this does not settle the issue. Evidentialists will disagree withmy verdict
of the bank cases and the grit cases. The important point is that the view developed here gives
us a new way to adjudicate the debate, and it is not clear why one would think that eviden-
tialism is the default. The evidentialist can disagree that non-evidential facts provide reasons
to form interrogative and anti-interrogative attitudes or they could disagree that interrogative
and anti-interrogative attitudes are forms of suspension. In order to respond in either way
they need to defend precise evidentialist-friendly views about which participants compete in
the epistemic competition and precise views about the normative profile of those states. This
is a much more challenging task than bunching up their noses in an incredulous stare at the
thought that non-evidential considerations are within the epistemic’s reach. In this way, at
least, the framework developed here moves the debate about evidentialism forward.
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